nuclear.academy
Atlas

The fuel cycle, and where it happens

Two diagrams to read the map with — the civil cycle and the two routes to weapons material — then the facilities themselves, each entry linked to the public record it came from.

The civil (peaceful) fuel cycle

The civil nuclear fuel cycle Mining and milling, conversion, enrichment to reactor grade, fuel fabrication, power reactor, spent-fuel storage, then either direct geological disposal (open cycle) or reprocessing with recycled uranium and plutonium returned to fuel fabrication (closed cycle). FRONT END REACTOR BACK END Mining & milling ore → U₃O₈ “yellowcake” Conversion U₃O₈ → UF₆ gas Enrichment 0.7 % → 3–5 % U-235 Fuel fabrication UO₂ pellets → assemblies Power reactor fission → heat → power Spent-fuel storage pool, then dry cask Geological disposal open cycle: once-through Reprocessing separates U, Pu, waste MOX / recycled fuel Pu + U back into fuel Vitrified waste high-level waste → glass closed cycle recovered U and Pu Solid arrows: the once-through (open) cycle used in the United States and most of the world. Dashed: the closed cycle (France, Japan, Russia, the UK historically), which recycles uranium and plutonium. Safeguards attention concentrates on the two accent-marked steps: enrichment (the same machines can go past reactor grade) and reprocessing (the only step that separates plutonium). Sources: IAEA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System definitions; World Nuclear Association, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle”; U.S. NRC, “Stages of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.”
Text version of the diagram
  1. Mining and milling: ore to U₃O₈ (“yellowcake”).
  2. Conversion: U₃O₈ to UF₆ gas.
  3. Enrichment: 0.7 % to 3–5 % U-235 — safeguards-critical.
  4. Fuel fabrication: UO₂ pellets into assemblies.
  5. Power reactor: fission, heat, electricity.
  6. Spent-fuel storage: pool, then dry cask.
  7. Open cycle: geological disposal. Closed cycle: reprocessing (safeguards-critical) separates uranium and plutonium, which return to fuel fabrication as MOX or recycled fuel; fission products are vitrified as high-level waste.

The two routes to weapons-usable material

The two routes to weapons-usable material Both routes share the civil front end of mining and conversion. The uranium route continues enrichment well past reactor grade to highly enriched uranium, which is converted to metal. The plutonium route irradiates natural or low-enriched uranium briefly in a reactor and then reprocesses the fuel to separate plutonium, which is converted to metal. Either material then requires weaponization, which is outside the fuel cycle. URANIUM ROUTE PLUTONIUM ROUTE Mining & milling the same ore and mills Conversion to UF₆, UO₂, or metal Enrichment carried to ≥ 90 % U-235 HEU metal conversion and casting Production reactor natural/LEU fuel, brief run Reprocessing separates plutonium Pu metal conversion and casting Weaponization outside the fuel cycle The front end is identical to the civil cycle. The routes diverge at exactly the two steps the civil diagram marks: how far enrichment is carried, and whether plutonium is separated. Neither route is depicted below the level of public overview; the IAEA’s significant quantities — 25 kg of U-235 in HEU, 8 kg of plutonium — are the reference amounts safeguards are designed to detect. Sources: IAEA Safeguards Glossary (2022 ed.), §§ 3.14, 4.24; U.S. NRC backgrounders on enrichment and reprocessing; National Academies, “Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium” (1994), ch. 1.
Text version of the diagram

Shared front end: mining and milling, conversion. Uranium route: enrichment continued to 90 % U-235 or more, then conversion to HEU metal. Plutonium route: natural or low-enriched fuel irradiated briefly in a production reactor, reprocessed to separate plutonium, then converted to metal. Both feed weaponization, which is outside the fuel cycle and not depicted. IAEA significant quantities: 25 kg U-235 in HEU; 8 kg plutonium.

Every nuclear facility on the map sits somewhere on one of these two diagrams, and most of what nuclear security does can be read off them.

The civil cycle takes uranium ore through milling, conversion to the gas uranium hexafluoride, enrichment from the natural 0.7 percent of uranium-235 to the 3–5 percent a power reactor needs, and fabrication into ceramic fuel pellets. After three to six years in a reactor the spent fuel is intensely radioactive and is cooled in water, then stored in dry casks. In the open cycle that is where it stays until geological disposal. In the closed cycle it is reprocessed: the uranium and plutonium are chemically separated and returned to fuel fabrication, and the fission products are immobilized in glass. Newer reactor designs shift the numbers — some use fuel enriched to just under 20 percent (HALEU), some run on fuel forms other than pellets — but not the shape of the cycle.

The weapons routes share the civil front end. The uranium route keeps enriching, from reactor grade to 90 percent and above. The plutonium route runs natural or low-enriched fuel through a reactor for a short time, so that the plutonium produced is mostly the isotope plutonium-239, and then reprocesses it out. What makes a state’s program worrying is therefore not that it mines uranium or runs a reactor, but that it enriches beyond what any reactor needs, or separates plutonium without a civil use for it. That is why the international safeguards system spends its effort on those two steps, and why the map marks enrichment and reprocessing plants distinctly.

A caution on reading the map. The presence of a facility says nothing by itself about intent: France reprocesses on an industrial scale for its civil program, several countries enrich for the commercial fuel market, and research reactors run on every continent. The diagrams show capability; the safeguards record — declarations, inspections, and the IAEA’s conclusions — is what speaks to use.

Facilities on the map

Loading facilities…

Layers:

Map tiles © OpenFreeMap, © OpenMapTiles, data © OpenStreetMap contributors. Facility data by layer: IPFM facility maps and tables (© International Panel on Fissile Materials, cited per entry); U.S. Department of Defense Nuclear Matters Handbook for the U.S. sites; Wikidata (CC0) for the interim civil layer and for coordinates of U.S. sites, each entry linked to its record.

Table view — interim civil layer (entries matching the filters)
NameStageCountryStatusFirst operationSource
Table view — enrichment and reprocessing plants (IPFM) and state weapons-program sites
NameCountryStage / roleDesignationStatusSafeguardsCapacitySource
Register view — IAEA fuel-cycle facilities (NFCFDB) and research reactors (RRDB), … entries; coordinates pending review

These are the official registers, re-served with their own fields. Coordinates are attached only through a reviewed crosswalk; until a person has confirmed a match, an entry is listed here and not drawn on the map. Filter:

NameRegisterCountryTypeStatusCapacity / powerStartOn map?

How the layers are sourced

Tiered provenance. Identity — that a facility exists, what it is, its status — comes only from an official register (tier 1: the IAEA's NFCFDB and RRDB exports, re-served in the register view) or, for the fissile-material and weapons-program layers, from a published compilation that names it (tier 2: the International Panel on Fissile Materials' facility maps and tables; the U.S. Department of Defense's Nuclear Matters Handbook for the eight U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise sites; official, IPFM, Nuclear Notebook and decree-based sources for the other states' weapons-program sites). Crowd-sourced data (tier 3: Wikidata) is used only for coordinates, and only through a crosswalk that a person reviews; the interim civil layer is the earlier Wikidata build kept visible, labelled, until the register entries have reviewed coordinates.

The weapons-program layer lists sites that a state has itself disclosed or that a standing published compilation places in a weapons program, with a plain description of role and status and nothing more — no protection, layout or inventory detail, and no facility whose existence rests on press reporting alone. Designations (military, dual-use, civilian, uncertain) are IPFM's own and are reproduced as given; where IPFM marks a plant as safeguarded it is because the state has placed it under IAEA safeguards. Beyond the IPFM rows and the U.S. complex, the layer carries production reactors (current and historical), weapons laboratories, assembly plants and test sites in the other eight states, each from a single cited source: a regulator's or agency's own page (ONR, CEA, DOE), an IPFM country page, the Bulletin's Nuclear Notebook, or Russia's Decree No. 556 of 2007 as compiled by Pavel Podvig. Where the only coordinate available is a city or commune centroid the popup says so; two sites with no defensible coordinate appear in the table only. Israel's entry follows its sources in describing, not asserting, a program the state neither confirms nor denies. The layer remains incomplete by design — a site is added when a source of that kind names it, not before.