The fuel cycle, and where it happens
Two diagrams to read the map with — the civil cycle and the two routes to weapons material — then the facilities themselves, each entry linked to the public record it came from.
The civil (peaceful) fuel cycle
The two routes to weapons-usable material
Every nuclear facility on the map sits somewhere on one of these two diagrams, and most of what nuclear security does can be read off them.
The civil cycle takes uranium ore through milling, conversion to the gas uranium hexafluoride, enrichment from the natural 0.7 percent of uranium-235 to the 3–5 percent a power reactor needs, and fabrication into ceramic fuel pellets. After three to six years in a reactor the spent fuel is intensely radioactive and is cooled in water, then stored in dry casks. In the open cycle that is where it stays until geological disposal. In the closed cycle it is reprocessed: the uranium and plutonium are chemically separated and returned to fuel fabrication, and the fission products are immobilized in glass. Newer reactor designs shift the numbers — some use fuel enriched to just under 20 percent (HALEU), some run on fuel forms other than pellets — but not the shape of the cycle.
The weapons routes share the civil front end. The uranium route keeps enriching, from reactor grade to 90 percent and above. The plutonium route runs natural or low-enriched fuel through a reactor for a short time, so that the plutonium produced is mostly the isotope plutonium-239, and then reprocesses it out. What makes a state’s program worrying is therefore not that it mines uranium or runs a reactor, but that it enriches beyond what any reactor needs, or separates plutonium without a civil use for it. That is why the international safeguards system spends its effort on those two steps, and why the map marks enrichment and reprocessing plants distinctly.
A caution on reading the map. The presence of a facility says nothing by itself about intent: France reprocesses on an industrial scale for its civil program, several countries enrich for the commercial fuel market, and research reactors run on every continent. The diagrams show capability; the safeguards record — declarations, inspections, and the IAEA’s conclusions — is what speaks to use.
Facilities on the map
Table view — interim civil layer (entries matching the filters)
| Name | Stage | Country | Status | First operation | Source |
|---|
Table view — enrichment and reprocessing plants (IPFM) and state weapons-program sites
| Name | Country | Stage / role | Designation | Status | Safeguards | Capacity | Source |
|---|
Register view — IAEA fuel-cycle facilities (NFCFDB) and research reactors (RRDB), … entries; coordinates pending review
| Name | Register | Country | Type | Status | Capacity / power | Start | On map? |
|---|
How the layers are sourced
Tiered provenance. Identity — that a facility exists, what it is, its status — comes only from an official register (tier 1: the IAEA's NFCFDB and RRDB exports, re-served in the register view) or, for the fissile-material and weapons-program layers, from a published compilation that names it (tier 2: the International Panel on Fissile Materials' facility maps and tables; the U.S. Department of Defense's Nuclear Matters Handbook for the eight U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise sites; official, IPFM, Nuclear Notebook and decree-based sources for the other states' weapons-program sites). Crowd-sourced data (tier 3: Wikidata) is used only for coordinates, and only through a crosswalk that a person reviews; the interim civil layer is the earlier Wikidata build kept visible, labelled, until the register entries have reviewed coordinates.
The weapons-program layer lists sites that a state has itself disclosed or that a standing published compilation places in a weapons program, with a plain description of role and status and nothing more — no protection, layout or inventory detail, and no facility whose existence rests on press reporting alone. Designations (military, dual-use, civilian, uncertain) are IPFM's own and are reproduced as given; where IPFM marks a plant as safeguarded it is because the state has placed it under IAEA safeguards. Beyond the IPFM rows and the U.S. complex, the layer carries production reactors (current and historical), weapons laboratories, assembly plants and test sites in the other eight states, each from a single cited source: a regulator's or agency's own page (ONR, CEA, DOE), an IPFM country page, the Bulletin's Nuclear Notebook, or Russia's Decree No. 556 of 2007 as compiled by Pavel Podvig. Where the only coordinate available is a city or commune centroid the popup says so; two sites with no defensible coordinate appear in the table only. Israel's entry follows its sources in describing, not asserting, a program the state neither confirms nor denies. The layer remains incomplete by design — a site is added when a source of that kind names it, not before.