Terms
- Additional Protocol
A supplement to a state’s comprehensive safeguards agreement that gives the IAEA broader information and access, so that it can conclude that a state has no undeclared nuclear material or activities — the “broader conclusion.” Without it the Agency can conclude only that declared material remained in peaceful use.
- Chronometry (age dating)
Determining the time since a nuclear material was last chemically purified, from the ratio of a decay daughter to its parent, solved through the Bateman equations. Several chronometers are used together so that they can be checked against one another.
- Containment and surveillance (C/S)
Safeguards measures — seals, cameras, radiation monitors — that watch the paths material could take between measurements, so that nothing can move unrecorded. They complement material accountancy and carry much of the load at bulk plants.
- Fissile material
A material whose nuclei can be split by neutrons of any energy, including slow ones — in practice uranium-235, uranium-233 and plutonium-239 — and which can therefore sustain a chain reaction.
- High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU)
Uranium enriched to between 5 % and just under 20 % uranium-235 — most commonly 19.75 % — used by many advanced reactor designs. Still LEU by definition, but closer to the HEU threshold.
- Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Uranium containing 20 % or more of the isotope uranium-235. Weapons-grade material is typically enriched to about 90 %; the IAEA treats all HEU as direct-use material.
- Improvised nuclear device (IND)
A crude nuclear explosive built outside a state weapons program — most plausibly a gun-type device using highly enriched uranium.
- Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)
The IAEA’s voluntary reporting system, with 145 participating states, for incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control: 4,626 incidents from 1993 to 2025.
- Low-enriched uranium (LEU)
Uranium enriched above the natural 0.7 % but below 20 % uranium-235. Power-reactor fuel is typically 3–5 %.
- Material balance
The accounting closed for each material balance area over a period: beginning inventory plus receipts minus shipments minus ending inventory. Its residual is the material unaccounted for.
- Material unaccounted for (MUF)
The difference between the book inventory and the measured physical inventory of nuclear material in a material balance area over a period: inputs minus outputs minus what is still there. Never exactly zero in a bulk-handling plant, because every measurement has an uncertainty; the question is whether the MUF is consistent with that uncertainty.
- Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel
Reactor fuel made from a blend of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide, the usual way of using plutonium recovered by reprocessing. Spent MOX is generally not reprocessed again.
- Nuclear forensics
The examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence contaminated with it, to establish what it is, how and where it was made, and how it came to be where it was found, in support of an investigation.
- Nuclear safety
“The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation risks.” The threat is failure, not intent.
- Nuclear security
“The prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities.” The defining feature is an adversary who intends harm.
- Nuclear surety
The policies, procedures, controls, and actions encompassing safety, security, and use-control measures that ensure a nuclear weapon suffers no accident, incident, unauthorized detonation, or degradation of effectiveness. A U.S. weapons-program term; outside the civil enterprise.
- Radiological dispersal device (RDD)
A conventional explosive or other means used to spread radioactive material (a “dirty bomb”); its effects are contamination, disruption and fear rather than nuclear yield.
- Reprocessing
Chemical separation of spent fuel into uranium, plutonium, and waste streams. PUREX is the only process ever run at commercial scale; it produces separated plutonium, which is the security fact about reprocessing.
- Safeguards
The system of measures — material accounting, containment and surveillance, inspection and analysis — by which the IAEA verifies that a state is complying with its undertakings not to divert nuclear material or misuse nuclear technology.
- Separative work unit (SWU)
The unit of effort in isotope enrichment. Most of the separative work needed to reach weapons-grade uranium is already expended in reaching reactor-grade, which is why an enrichment plant is inherently dual-use.
- Signature (forensic)
Any measurable property of a sample — isotopic, chemical, physical, or collateral — that narrows down where it came from or what was done to it. Conclusions rest on the number of independent signatures that agree.
- Significant quantity (SQ)
The approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded: 25 kg of uranium-235 in HEU, 8 kg of plutonium, 8 kg of uranium-233. Used to set safeguards detection goals; not an estimate of what any particular device needs.
- Special nuclear material (SNM)
Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, and any other material the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear material — the statutory category that U.S. material control and accounting requirements attach to.
- Spent-fuel standard
The principle that plutonium is adequately protected when it is as hard to recover as the plutonium in ordinary spent reactor fuel — behind an intense radiation barrier. It is the reason plutonium in spent fuel is treated so differently from separated plutonium.
- Timeliness detection goal
The IAEA target for how quickly a diversion of one significant quantity should be detected — about one month for separated plutonium or HEU, three months for plutonium in spent fuel, and a year for natural or low-enriched uranium — which sets how often material is verified.
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Opened for signature in 1968 and in force since 5 March 1970; recognizes five nuclear-weapon states, binds other parties not to acquire nuclear weapons, and rests on the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use.
- Tritium
Hydrogen-3, a radioactive isotope with a 12.3-year half-life, the fuel of deuterium–tritium fusion and a material used to boost fission weapons. Not “nuclear material” under the NPT, so not covered by IAEA safeguards.