nuclear.academy
Situation · as of 2026-09-22

Nuclear forces, arms control, and verification

The figures and statuses that Module 1 keeps out of its body because they change: warhead counts, treaty status, the verification gap in Iran, attacks on nuclear facilities, and the trafficking record. Each section carries the date its data refers to and its own sources.

This page is dated. Each heading gives the date its data refers to; the “as of” date at the top is the last time the whole page was re-checked against its sources. If that date is more than a few months old, treat the numbers as history.

World nuclear forces (SIPRI estimate for January 2026)

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s estimate for January 2026, published in June 2026 [1]. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Nuclear Notebook and the Federation of American Scientists’ “Status of World Nuclear Forces” give the same figures for the same date [3]: all three are the work of one team (Kristensen, Korda, Johns, Knight-Boyle), and the Bulletin columns are where the per-country detail behind each row lives. FAS splits the deployed column into strategic and nonstrategic; the U.S. figure below is 1,670 strategic plus about 100 nonstrategic.

StateDeployedStoredMilitary stockpileRetired, awaiting dismantlementTotal inventory
United States1,7701,9303,7001,3425,042
Russia1,7962,6044,4001,0205,420
United Kingdom120105225–225
France2801029080370
China34586620–620
India12178190. .190
Pakistan–170170. .170
North Korea–6060. .60
Israel–9090. .90
World4,0125,7339,7452,44212,187

Notation follows SIPRI: ”–” means nil or negligible; ”. .” means not available or not applicable.

Israel. The 90 in the table is an estimate under a policy of deliberate ambiguity. SIPRI: Israel “continues to maintain its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity, leaving significant uncertainty about the number and characteristics of its nuclear weapons”; FAS notes that Israel “has produced enough plutonium for 100–200 warheads” and that the 90 rests on delivery-platform counts and U.S. intelligence estimates [1][2]. Israel has never confirmed or denied possessing nuclear weapons.

What changed from SIPRI’s January 2025 estimate: the total inventory fell from 12,241 to 12,187 (retired U.S. and Russian warheads being dismantled), while the military stockpile — warheads available for use — rose from 9,614 to 9,745 and deployed warheads from 3,912 to 4,012. SIPRI’s own summary: “the number of nuclear warheads in the world continues to decline, but this is only due to Russia and the USA dismantling retired warheads,” and “year-on-year increases can be seen in the number of operational (stockpiled) nuclear warheads. This trend seems likely to continue and will probably accelerate in the coming years” [1].

China’s stockpile grew from about 600 to about 620 during 2025. On silos, SIPRI’s chapter reports the U.S. Department of Defense assessment of 2025 that China “had loaded more than 100 missiles into three new missile silo fields,” and notes there is no public evidence that those missiles are armed with nuclear warheads; SIPRI’s June 2026 press release puts it as “hundreds of missiles.” This page uses the chapter’s figure [1].

Strategic arms control (status as of September 2026)

New START, the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian strategic forces, expired on 5 February 2026 with no successor [3]. Its verification had already lapsed: on-site inspections stopped in March 2020 and were never resumed, and Russia’s suspension of the treaty in February 2023 ended the data exchanges [4]. Russia had proposed on 22 September 2025 that both sides keep observing the treaty’s central limits informally for one year; the United States did not formally respond, and called instead for a new treaty covering more weapons and more parties. Russia’s foreign minister said in February 2026 that Russia would keep to the limits “only as long as the United States does not exceed the above limits” [3]. SIPRI notes that the expiry “has eliminated that source of data from the public debate” [1].

No numerical limits anywhere. With New START gone, no treaty in force limits the size of any nuclear-armed state’s arsenal. China, France, and the United Kingdom were never party to numerical limits; the NPT’s Article VI obliges its parties to pursue disarmament but sets no ceiling; and the TPNW binds only its own parties, none of which has nuclear weapons.

Nuclear testing (status as of September 2026)

No explosive nuclear test has been confirmed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s monitoring system since North Korea’s in 2017. On 6 February 2026 the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, Thomas DiNanno, alleged that China “conducted one such yield-producing nuclear test on June 22 of 2020”; China rejected the claim and said it had “always honored its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing,” and the CTBTO’s executive secretary said its monitoring system “did not detect any event consistent with the characteristics of a nuclear weapon test explosion” at the time alleged [5]. On 30 October 2025 the U.S. President had stated that he had “instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis,” without specifying whether explosive testing was meant [6]; SIPRI’s 2026 yearbook records “concerns over the possible resumption of nuclear testing” [1]. The CTBT remains signed but not in force.

The treaty review cycles (status as of September 2026)

The Eleventh NPT Review Conference (New York, 28 April – 22 May 2026) ended without an agreed final document — the third consecutive review conference to do so, after 2015 and 2022. The dispute that blocked consensus was over a paragraph stating that Iran “can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,” which the United States insisted on and Iran refused, and over the absence of language condemning the June 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s safeguarded facilities. Non-nuclear-weapon states also objected that the draft asked the nuclear-armed states only for “constructive dialogue” on disarmament [7].

The first Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is scheduled for 30 November – 4 December 2026 in New York [8].

Safeguards and the verification gap in Iran (status as of September 2026)

The IAEA’s Safeguards Implementation Report for 2025, summarized in July 2026: 138 states had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in force; for 75 of them the Agency drew the broader conclusion that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities”; for 63 it could conclude only that “declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities” [9].

Iran, in sequence:

Attacks on civil nuclear facilities (status as of September 2026)

Material out of regulatory control (ITDB, data through 2025, released March 2026)

The IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database, with 145 participating states, held 4,626 incidents for 1993–2025, of which 730 were thefts or attempted thefts; about 55 percent of those thefts occurred during transport, rising to nearly 70 percent in the past decade. In 2025, 236 incidents were reported by 34 states, up from 147 in 2024 — an increase the IAEA attributes to retrospective reporting rather than to a real rise. Of the 4,626 incidents, 3,147 were in Group III, those not connected, or unlikely to be connected, with trafficking [17].

Regulatory status items referred from Module 1 (as of September 2026)

Sources

  1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2026, chapter 8, “World nuclear forces,” and table 8A.1 (figures as of January 2026); SIPRI press release, June 2026.
  2. H. M. Kristensen, M. Korda, E. Johns and M. Knight-Boyle, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists (as of the beginning of 2026); the same authors’ Nuclear Notebook columns in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Russian, United States, Chinese, and Indian nuclear weapons, 2026; Pakistan and French, 2025).
  3. Arms Control Association, “New START Expires; U.S. Urges ‘Modernized’ Treaty,” Arms Control Today, March 2026.
  4. Arms Control Association, “Russia Suspends New START,” Arms Control Today, March 2023.
  5. Al Jazeera, “No evidence to support US claim China conducted nuclear blast test: Monitor,” 7 February 2026.
  6. NPR, report on the President’s 30 October 2025 statement on nuclear weapons testing (npr.org, 30 October 2025).
  7. Arms Control Association, “2026 NPT Review Conference Stymied by Disputes,” Arms Control Today, June 2026.
  8. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “First Review Conference” (TPNW), icanw.org.
  9. International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Draws Safeguards Conclusions for 179 States,” Safeguards Implementation Report for 2025, 15 July 2026.
  10. RFE/RL, report on the IAEA’s September 2026 report to the Board of Governors on Iran, 2 September 2026.
  11. Encyclopaedia Britannica, “2026 Iran war,” updated 20 September 2026.
  12. Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Sites Signal Resolve to End Tehran’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 5 March 2026 (reporting IAEA confirmation of strikes on Natanz and Isfahan).
  13. The Times of Israel, “US-Iran deal grants UN inspectors access to nuclear sites, IAEA chief says,” 26 June 2026.
  14. RFE/RL, report on the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 9 September 2026, 9 September 2026.
  15. American Nuclear Society, “IAEA: Chernobyl drone strike latest threat to nuclear safety in Ukraine,” Nuclear Newswire, 18 February 2025.
  16. NucNet, “IAEA says Chernobyl shelter lost primary safety functions following drone strike,” 8 December 2025.
  17. International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Database: About 55% of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Thefts Since 1993 Occurred During Transport,” press release, 23 March 2026; as reported by American Nuclear Society, Nuclear Newswire, 25 March 2026.
  18. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Regulatory Framework for Fusion Machines,” proposed rule, Federal Register, 26 February 2026.
  19. U.S. Department of Energy, “U.S. Department of Energy Meets President Trump’s Goal, Delivers Third Advanced Reactor,” 1 July 2026.

Companion to the module. Last re-checked 2026-09-22.