The U.S. back end: spent fuel, Yucca Mountain, the money, and the 2026 recycling push
The dated figures behind Module 2: how much spent fuel there is and where, what Yucca Mountain's status actually is, what the breach of the disposal contracts has cost, what the Nuclear Waste Fund holds, and where the 2026 Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campus program and the reprocessing rulemakings stand.
Compiled by the author for a public panel on 12 August 2026 and last re-checked on that date. Every figure below carries its own as-of date and source. Items marked ⚠ are commonly misstated; the correction is given. The site takes no position on whether the United States should recycle its spent fuel.
Inventory (as of 31 December 2022 measured; June 2025 working figure)
- About 95,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel (DOE working figure, June 2025 [1]); the last hard measurement was 90,963 MTHM in 314,878 assemblies at the end of 2022 [2].
- Growing by about 2,000 tons a year [1][3]; DOE projects 85,000 more tons by 2070 [1].
- Just over half is in dry casks — 48,926 MTHM dry versus 42,037 in pools at the end of 2022; 2021 was the first year dry storage exceeded pool storage [2].
- ⚠ Site counts depend on the denominator: 73 sites with reactors or storage installations, 20 of them with every reactor shut down (PNNL, end 2022); 75 sites in 33 states (GAO, 2021); 82 NRC-licensed storage installations in 36 states (a licensing count, May 2025). The safe formulation is “roughly 75 sites in about a third of the states” [2][3].
Yucca Mountain (status as of August 2026)
- The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended in 1987, names Yucca Mountain as the only candidate repository and caps the first repository at 70,000 MTHM, of which DOE allocated 63,000 to commercial fuel — a figure the current inventory already exceeds by about half [4].
- DOE filed its license application in June 2008 and moved to withdraw it in 2010; the licensing board refused, the Commission split 2–2, and the proceeding was suspended on 30 September 2011 for lack of funds. A federal court ordered the NRC to resume with remaining money in 2013.
- ⚠ The safety review did not reject the site. The NRC staff’s Safety Evaluation Report (2014–15) found the application met the post-closure standards over one million years; what it found lacking was that DOE had not obtained the land withdrawal and water rights (10 CFR 63.121). Technically adequate, legally incomplete [5].
- The adjudication has never resumed. Finishing it would need on the order of **12 million a year for fund management and site upkeep.
- 2026 administration position: DOE’s acting deputy assistant secretary says Yucca is “still the codified repository” but the Secretary “has made it clear it is not the solution”; no action has been taken to withdraw the application or repeal the designation. ⚠ “Yucca Mountain is dead” is a Nevada senator’s phrase, not an administration statement [6].
- 4 August 2026: Nevada’s senators introduced S. 5233 to repeal the designation and require withdrawal of the application [7].
The money (as of 30 September 2025)
The breach. Under the 1982 Act’s Standard Contracts DOE was to begin taking fuel on 31 January 1998. It has accepted none. Damages are paid from the Treasury’s Judgment Fund — by taxpayers, not from the Nuclear Waste Fund — under a 2002 appellate ruling.
| Item | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Paid to utilities to date (settlements + judgments) | $12.2 billion | DOE FY2025 Agency Financial Report [8] |
| Paid in FY2025 alone | $1.12 billion | same |
| Estimated remaining liability | $38.6–44.3 billion | same |
| ⚠ Total liability including amounts already paid | $50.8–56.5 billion | same — the upper figure is often misquoted as “remaining” |
DOE’s estimate assumes Congress will both appropriate funds and amend the Act to permit consolidated interim storage; if interim storage slips, the number grows.
The Nuclear Waste Fund. Ratepayers paid a fee of 0.1 cent per kilowatt-hour from 1983 until a federal court ordered collection stopped in 2013 (DOE suspended it in May 2014). The Fund’s balance at 30 September 2025 was **21.8 billion was fees and most of the rest Treasury interest; FY2025 income was $1.96 billion, almost entirely interest [9]. The Fund cannot be spent without appropriation and sits on-budget, where its balance offsets the deficit.
Private consolidated interim storage (status as of January 2026)
- Two facilities hold NRC licenses: ISP/WCS in Andrews County, Texas (40-year license, September 2021, up to 5,000 tons) and Holtec HI-STORE in Lea County, New Mexico (May 2023).
- The Fifth Circuit vacated both licenses in 2023–24; the Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds in NRC v. Texas (18 June 2025, 6–3) without deciding whether the NRC has authority to license private away-from-reactor storage — that question is unresolved. Certiorari on the remaining Holtec challenge was denied 12 January 2026 [10].
- Neither is being built. Holtec cancelled HI-STORE in October 2025 after New Mexico’s 2023 statute barred storage without state consent; ISP has reportedly said it will not proceed without Texas’s consent (trade press; not confirmed against a company source). The legal barrier is gone; state consent is now the binding constraint.
The 2026 recycling push (status as of August 2026)
- Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses. DOE issued a request for information on 28 January 2026; 28 applications came from 26 states; memoranda of understanding were signed with five states on 24 July 2026 (announced 28 July) — Tennessee among them. ⚠ The MOUs are non-binding; no bill in the 119th Congress authorizes the program; “DOE will pick three of five by the end of 2026” is an Oklahoma state statement, not DOE’s [11].
- Statutory obstacles named by the program’s own critics and supporters alike: the Act caps DOE-provided interim storage at 1,900 tons (§135) and bars a monitored retrievable storage facility until a repository is licensed (§148); a governor’s “consent” under §135 is a disapproval Congress may override, not a veto [4].
- Regulatory gap for safeguards. 10 CFR 74.51(a) excludes “an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant” by name from Category I material control and accounting requirements — a gap identified in 2009. The NRC’s proposed one-step Part 70 licensing pathway for reprocessing (91 FR 38124, 24 June 2026; comments closed 10 August 2026) and its companion physical-protection rule (91 FR 38928, 26 June 2026) address licensing and guards but do not amend Part 74. The NRC’s own proposed rule says, in the present tense, “The gaps, however, remain” [12].
- The DOE-authorization route. Atomic Energy Act §110a exempts separation of special nuclear material done under contract for DOE from NRC licensing, and DOE’s 22 April 2026 recycling solicitation explicitly offers DOE authorization “rather than NRC licensing.” A facility on that route would sit outside 10 CFR Parts 73 and 74 and outside a public hearing [13].
- Technology status. PUREX is the only reprocessing process ever run at commercial scale; the largest U.S. demonstration of an advanced aqueous process on real commercial spent fuel totals about 4.5 kg; INL’s pyroprocessing of EBR-II fuel has treated about 5.5 of 25 tons in 27 years and “has not been developed past the engineering scale” (INL to NRC, December 2023) [14]. Curio filed a letter of intent for a 4,000 t/yr plant on 27 May 2026; no license application has been submitted [15].
Economics (prices as of 31 July 2026)
- Uranium closed July 2026 at 225/kg U (Cameco spot) [16]. The standard break-even estimate for reprocessing versus direct disposal is above 625–650 today [17]; CRS (2025) finds closed cycles 5–20 percent more expensive and the once-through cycle cheaper for at least fifty years [18].
- Plant costs: DOE’s estimate for Rokkasho-scale (800 t/yr) is about 44 billion or more [19]. Rokkasho itself has had 27 postponements at an all-in cost of ¥18.66 trillion (about $117 billion), with full operation targeted for 2032 [20]. THORP ran at about 60 percent and La Hague at about 65 percent of nameplate.
- The status quo costs about 10 million a year to keep (order of magnitude only) [8][21].
International comparison (as of August 2026)
- No country that reprocesses avoids a repository. France (Cigéo, costed at €37 billion in 2025 conditions; about 88 percent of its deep-disposal volume is long-lived intermediate waste, not vitrified HLW), the UK, Japan, and Russia all reprocess or did, and all are siting or building repositories [22].
- Finland: the regulator STUK issued its favorable safety statement on Onkalo on 4 August 2026; the government’s operating-license decision was expected in the autumn; no commercial fuel had been emplaced [23].
- United Kingdom: decided 24 January 2025 to immobilize about 117 of the 141 tons of separated plutonium at Sellafield rather than recycle it [24].
- France reprocesses only uranium-oxide fuel; spent MOX accumulates, and the regulator reports the plutonium stock growing [25].
Sources
- U.S. Department of Energy, FY2026 Congressional Justification, Nuclear Waste Disposal (June 2025).
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, PNNL-33938 Rev. 1.1, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory (December 2024), data at 31 December 2022.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, nuclear-waste disposal key issues page and GAO-21-603 (September 2021); Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, commercial SNF fact sheet Rev. 2.
- Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§10101 ff.), §§135, 148, and the 70,000-MTHM cap; NRC backgrounder on the Yucca Mountain license review.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1949, Safety Evaluation Report for the Yucca Mountain application, vols. 2–5 (2014–15); In re Aiken County (D.C. Cir. 2013); NRC Chairman’s testimony, 4 March 2015.
- Utility Dive, “Will DOE’s nuclear lifecycle innovation campuses finally close the fuel cycle?” (2026) — quoting DOE’s acting deputy assistant secretary.
- Office of Sen. Rosen, release of 4 August 2026 on S. 5233.
- U.S. Department of Energy, FY2025 Agency Financial Report, notes 19 and 22 (December 2025).
- U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Waste Fund Annual Financial Report Summary, FY2025.
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas, 605 U.S. ___ (18 June 2025); Fifth Circuit dismissals of 20 October 2025; Supreme Court order list of 12 January 2026.
- U.S. Department of Energy, NLIC request for information (SAM.gov, 28 January 2026) and release of 28 July 2026; Oklahoma Department of Commerce statement.
- 91 FR 38124 (24 June 2026) and 91 FR 38928 (26 June 2026); 10 CFR 74.51(a).
- Atomic Energy Act §110a; 10 CFR 70.11; DOE recycling solicitation of 22 April 2026; Executive Order 14299 §5(c).
- INL/RPT-23-03365 (NRC TLR-RES/DE/REB-2023-10, December 2023); ORNL/TM-2020/1751; OECD-NEA technology-readiness assessment (2019).
- American Nuclear Society, Nuclear Newswire, 29 May 2026.
- Cameco, published spot price, 31 July 2026.
- Bunn, Fetter, Holdren and van der Zwaan (2003).
- Congressional Research Service, R48364 (23 January 2025).
- GAO-08-483; Congressional Budget Office (2007).
- Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, provisional operating plan; cost figure as reported in 2026.
- Three Yankees presentation to the Council of State Governments Eastern Regional Conference, 29 October 2020.
- National Academies (2023); Andra, Cigéo key figures; Orano, La Hague site description.
- STUK statement of 4 August 2026.
- Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (UK), 24 January 2025.
- Autorité de sûreté nucléaire et de radioprotection (France), plutonium inventory statements.
Compiled from the author’s panel data annex of 11 August 2026, which carries the URL for each item above.