Should nuclear-cooperation agreements require partners to forgo enrichment?
The 'gold standard' debate: whether a supplier state should condition its civil nuclear cooperation on the recipient giving up enrichment and reprocessing, or accept safeguards alone.
The question
When a supplier state (the United States, France, Russia, China, South Korea) signs a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with a newcomer, should it require the partner to forgo building its own enrichment or reprocessing plants — the two stages of the fuel cycle that produce weapons-usable material — or is it enough that the partner accept IAEA safeguards, ideally with an Additional Protocol?
In U.S. practice this is the “123 agreement” question, after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, and the 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates, in which the UAE renounced enrichment and reprocessing, is the benchmark its advocates call the gold standard.
Why it matters
Enrichment and reprocessing are the material barrier (Module 1, section 4). A state with a working enrichment plant is a few months, not years, from weapons-grade material if it chooses. The NPT does not forbid a non-nuclear-weapon state from enriching; it forbids weapons and requires safeguards. So the question is whether suppliers should use their leverage to add a restriction the treaty does not contain — and whether doing so is nonproliferation or discrimination.
The question became concrete in 2026 when the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement that, as reported, permits Saudi enrichment and does not require an Additional Protocol — the opposite of the UAE model. Details and status are on the situation page.
The case for requiring it
- The material barrier is the only barrier that reliably works; every added enrichment plant is a latent weapons capability under any government the state may later have.
- A supplier that sets the condition and holds to it creates a norm; one that waives it for a strategic partner tells every other partner the condition is negotiable.
- Newcomer states have no economic case for enrichment: the world market is oversupplied and a national plant for a handful of reactors cannot compete.
- Safeguards detect; they do not prevent. Detection of a breakout at an enrichment plant gives warning of months at best.
The case against requiring it
- The NPT bargain (Article IV) promises the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear technology; a supplier condition that goes beyond the treaty is seen by many non-nuclear-weapon states as the nuclear-weapon states rewriting the deal.
- Suppliers compete. If the United States insists and Russia or China does not, the reactor contract — and the influence that comes with it — goes elsewhere, and the recipient ends up with the same enrichment plant and a less demanding safeguards partner.
- Some states have legitimate, or at least sincere, security reasons for wanting a latent capability, and a flat refusal pushes the program underground rather than preventing it.
- The right instrument is the Additional Protocol and intrusive verification, universally applied, not a patchwork of bilateral conditions.
What to read
- Atomic Energy Act §123 (42 U.S.C. §2153), and the U.S.–UAE agreement (2009) as the reference text.
- NPT Articles III and IV.
- The 2026 U.S.–Saudi agreement and the Arms Control Association’s explainer of September 2026.
- Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology (2011 revision).