nuclear.academy
Open question · reviewed 2026-09-22

Should nuclear-cooperation agreements require partners to forgo enrichment?

The 'gold standard' debate: whether a supplier state should condition its civil nuclear cooperation on the recipient giving up enrichment and reprocessing, or accept safeguards alone.

The question

When a supplier state (the United States, France, Russia, China, South Korea) signs a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with a newcomer, should it require the partner to forgo building its own enrichment or reprocessing plants — the two stages of the fuel cycle that produce weapons-usable material — or is it enough that the partner accept IAEA safeguards, ideally with an Additional Protocol?

In U.S. practice this is the “123 agreement” question, after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, and the 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates, in which the UAE renounced enrichment and reprocessing, is the benchmark its advocates call the gold standard.

Why it matters

Enrichment and reprocessing are the material barrier (Module 1, section 4). A state with a working enrichment plant is a few months, not years, from weapons-grade material if it chooses. The NPT does not forbid a non-nuclear-weapon state from enriching; it forbids weapons and requires safeguards. So the question is whether suppliers should use their leverage to add a restriction the treaty does not contain — and whether doing so is nonproliferation or discrimination.

The question became concrete in 2026 when the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement that, as reported, permits Saudi enrichment and does not require an Additional Protocol — the opposite of the UAE model. Details and status are on the situation page.

The case for requiring it

The case against requiring it

What to read

Background: how safeguards work · the fuel cycle and where security lives