nuclear.academy
Open question · reviewed 2026-09-22

Should the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing hold?

No state has tested explosively since 2017, and the treaty banning it has never entered into force. Whether the moratorium should be preserved, and what would be lost or gained by resuming.

The question

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996 and has never entered into force, because several states whose ratification it requires — the United States and China among them — have not ratified. In practice, every nuclear-armed state has observed a moratorium: the last explosive test by any state was North Korea’s in 2017. Should that moratorium be kept, formalized, or abandoned?

Why it matters

Testing is the third barrier to a new weapon and the fastest route to a new kind of weapon (Module 1, section 4). The moratorium is also the oldest and most widely observed nuclear restraint in existence, and its erosion would be visible to every state deciding whether the regime is worth belonging to. In 2025–26 the question stopped being academic: the U.S. President stated in October 2025 that he had instructed the military to begin testing “on an equal basis,” and in February 2026 a U.S. official alleged that China had conducted a very small explosive test in 2020, which China denies and the treaty’s monitoring system did not detect. Status is on the situation page.

The case for holding the moratorium

The case for resuming, or for keeping the option

What to read

Background: nuclear security why it matters