Should the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing hold?
No state has tested explosively since 2017, and the treaty banning it has never entered into force. Whether the moratorium should be preserved, and what would be lost or gained by resuming.
The question
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996 and has never entered into force, because several states whose ratification it requires — the United States and China among them — have not ratified. In practice, every nuclear-armed state has observed a moratorium: the last explosive test by any state was North Korea’s in 2017. Should that moratorium be kept, formalized, or abandoned?
Why it matters
Testing is the third barrier to a new weapon and the fastest route to a new kind of weapon (Module 1, section 4). The moratorium is also the oldest and most widely observed nuclear restraint in existence, and its erosion would be visible to every state deciding whether the regime is worth belonging to. In 2025–26 the question stopped being academic: the U.S. President stated in October 2025 that he had instructed the military to begin testing “on an equal basis,” and in February 2026 a U.S. official alleged that China had conducted a very small explosive test in 2020, which China denies and the treaty’s monitoring system did not detect. Status is on the situation page.
The case for holding the moratorium
- Every state gains more from others not testing than it loses from not testing itself; the states with the most experience have the least to learn.
- The International Monitoring System works: it detected every North Korean test. A resumption by one state ends the political basis for the others to refrain, and a cascade of tests is worse for everyone.
- Stockpile stewardship — the science-based program the United States has run since 1992 — has certified the arsenal annually without testing; there is no technical need.
- The environmental and health legacy of atmospheric and underground testing is not something any government wants to reopen.
The case for resuming, or for keeping the option
- An adversary that tests secretly at very low yield — the allegation made in 2026 — gains knowledge the moratorium denies to those who keep it; the monitoring system’s threshold is not zero.
- New warhead designs, as opposed to remanufactured old ones, may eventually require confirmation that simulation cannot provide.
- A demonstrated readiness to test is itself a deterrent signal.
- Ratifying the treaty would bind the United States legally while others remain unbound; keeping the moratorium informal preserves flexibility.
What to read
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996), text and entry-into-force provisions (Article XIV and Annex 2).
- CTBTO statements on the alleged 2020 event, February 2026.
- National Academies, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (2002; updated 2012).
- SIPRI Yearbook 2026 on testing concerns.