Treaties and Agreements: The Legal Architecture of Nuclear Restraint
The multilateral treaties, bilateral agreements, export regimes and UN instruments that make up the nuclear order — what each one obliges, who is bound, what it verifies, and which ones are gone.
Learning objectives
- Sort the instruments into their four families — nonproliferation, arms control, testing, and nuclear security — and say what each family does.
- State the NPT's three bargains and what the treaty does and does not verify.
- Trace the U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms-control lineage from SALT to the expiry of New START, and say what survives.
- Explain how export-control regimes and bilateral cooperation agreements work without being treaties.
- Read a news item about a treaty and know whether it is binding, verified, and in force.
The nuclear order is not one treaty but a layered set of instruments built over seventy years, each fixing a problem the last one left. This module is the map. Status that changes — who has ratified, what has expired, what is being negotiated — is on the situation page. Dates are given as opened for signature / entered into force where both matter.
1. Four families
It helps to sort by what a treaty is trying to stop:
- Nonproliferation — stopping more states from getting weapons. The NPT and the safeguards system, the nuclear-weapon-free zones, the export-control regimes.
- Arms control and disarmament — limiting or reducing the arsenals that exist. The U.S.–Soviet and U.S.–Russian bilateral treaties; the Prohibition Treaty.
- Testing — stopping nuclear explosions. The Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties.
- Nuclear security — keeping material out of non-state hands. The physical-protection convention, the nuclear-terrorism convention, Security Council resolution 1540.
A fifth category is not treaties at all but matters as much: bilateral cooperation agreements and political commitments, from a 123 agreement to a summit communiqué.
For each instrument, three questions: who is bound (parties), what is verified (and by whom), and is it in force. Most public confusion about treaties is confusion about one of the three.
2. Nonproliferation
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Opened for signature 1 July 1968; in force 5 March 1970; extended indefinitely in 1995; 191 parties, more than any other arms treaty. Three bargains, usually called pillars: non-nuclear-weapon states undertake never to acquire nuclear weapons (Article II) and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material (Article III); all parties undertake to pursue negotiations on disarmament (Article VI); and all parties have the right to peaceful nuclear technology and undertake to facilitate its exchange (Article IV). The treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as one that had tested before 1 January 1967 — the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom, France and China — and binds those five to the disarmament and cooperation articles but not to safeguards. Four states with weapons are outside it: India, Pakistan and Israel never joined; North Korea joined in 1985 and announced its withdrawal in 2003 under Article X, the only state ever to do so. Review conferences every five years assess it; the 2015, 2022 and 2026 conferences all ended without an agreed document (Module 1, section 5).
Safeguards agreements. The NPT’s verification is done through separate treaties between each state and the IAEA: comprehensive safeguards agreements on the INFCIRC/153 model, and Additional Protocols on the INFCIRC/540 model (Module 3). States outside the NPT that receive nuclear supply accept item-specific safeguards on the older INFCIRC/66 model, covering particular facilities rather than the whole program — the arrangement India, Pakistan and Israel operate under.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones. Regional treaties by which the states of a region renounce nuclear weapons and the nuclear-weapon states, in protocols, undertake not to use or threaten to use them against the zone: Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific (Rarotonga, 1985), Southeast Asia (Bangkok, 1995), Africa (Pelindaba, 1996) and Central Asia (Semipalatinsk, 2006), plus Mongolia’s single-state status. Together they cover the southern hemisphere and more than a hundred states. Antarctica, outer space and the seabed are demilitarized by separate treaties (1959, 1967, 1971).
Export-control regimes. Not treaties: groups of supplier states that agree, politically, on common rules for what they will sell and to whom. The Zangger Committee (1971) interprets the NPT’s Article III trigger list. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (founded 1974 after India’s test; guidelines published 1978, tightened after the Iraq revelations in 1992, and in 2011 for enrichment and reprocessing transfers) sets the rules most nuclear trade follows, and its guidelines are published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/254. The Missile Technology Control Regime (1987) does the same for delivery systems. Because they are political arrangements among suppliers, they bind no one legally and can be changed by consensus — the 2008 exemption that allowed nuclear trade with India despite its non-membership of the NPT is the standing example of both their flexibility and its cost.
Bilateral cooperation agreements. A state that supplies nuclear technology usually requires a bilateral agreement setting conditions — safeguards, no explosive use, consent rights over enrichment, reprocessing and retransfer. In the United States these are section 123 agreements under the Atomic Energy Act, and there are about two dozen in force. They are where a supplier can demand more than the NPT does, which is the subject of the open question on enrichment for newcomers.
3. Arms control and disarmament
The bilateral lineage, in order, because each treaty built on the last:
- SALT I (1972): the first limits on U.S. and Soviet strategic launchers, and the ABM Treaty limiting missile defenses. The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
- SALT II (1979): signed, never ratified by the United States, observed informally into the 1980s.
- INF Treaty (1987): eliminated all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles of 500–5,500 km range — the first treaty to abolish a whole class, with on-site inspection. The United States withdrew in 2019, citing Russian violation.
- START I (1991; in force 1994): the first real reductions in deployed strategic warheads, with an intrusive verification regime. Expired 2009.
- SORT (2002): a three-page treaty limiting deployed strategic warheads, with no verification of its own. Superseded.
- New START (2010; in force 2011): 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed launchers each, with data exchanges and inspections. Extended once, to 2026. Inspections stopped in 2020 and data exchanges in 2023; the treaty expired on 5 February 2026 with no successor. As of that date no treaty limits the size of any state’s nuclear arsenal (situation page).
Alongside the treaties, three cooperative programs of the 1990s and 2000s did as much for security as any treaty: the Cooperative Threat Reduction (“Nunn–Lugar”) program that helped secure and dismantle former Soviet weapons and material; the HEU Purchase Agreement (“Megatons to Megawatts,” 1993–2013) under which 500 tons of Russian weapons HEU were blended down and burned in U.S. reactors; and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (2000), under which each side was to dispose of 34 tons of weapons plutonium — suspended by Russia in 2016.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Adopted 2017; in force 22 January 2021; more than 70 parties. It prohibits its parties from developing, possessing, hosting, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, and provides a path for a weapon state to join and disarm. No nuclear-armed state and no state under a nuclear umbrella has joined; its supporters regard it as the disarmament pillar the NPT never delivered, its critics as a treaty among states that had nothing to give up. Its first review conference is in 2026.
4. Testing
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space and under water — the first arms-control treaty of the nuclear age, driven by fallout. Testing went underground.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) capped underground tests at 150 kilotons; verification protocols were not agreed until 1990.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) bans all nuclear explosions. It has 187 signatories and 178 ratifications but has never entered into force, because its Annex 2 requires ratification by 44 named states with nuclear technology, and nine have not: the United States, China, Egypt, Iran and Israel have signed but not ratified; India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed; Russia ratified in 2000 and revoked its ratification in 2023. The treaty’s organization nonetheless operates an International Monitoring System of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations that detected every North Korean test. A moratorium has held among the recognized weapon states since 1996 and among all states since 2017; whether it holds is an open question.
5. Nuclear security
These instruments address the threat this site is mostly about: material in the wrong hands.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980; in force 1987) originally covered only nuclear material in international transport. Its 2005 Amendment (in force 8 May 2016) extended it to material in domestic use, storage and transport and to the protection of facilities against sabotage, making it the only legally binding international instrument on physical protection of civil material. About 130 states are party to the amended convention.
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005; in force 2007) obliges parties to criminalize the possession and use of radioactive material with intent to cause harm, and to cooperate in prosecution and extradition.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted under Chapter VII and therefore binding on every UN member, requires all states to refrain from supporting non-state actors seeking nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, to adopt domestic laws to that end, and to control related materials. Its committee’s mandate runs to 2032. It is the instrument that reaches states outside every treaty.
Soft law. The IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2003) and its Nuclear Security Series guidance are not binding but are the standards regulators use, and the four Nuclear Security Summits (2010–2016) turned much of that guidance into national commitments and produced the removal of HEU from more than a dozen countries.
6. The ones that failed, and what they teach
- The Agreed Framework (1994) froze North Korea’s plutonium program in exchange for fuel oil and light-water reactors; it collapsed in 2002 over a covert enrichment program, and North Korea tested in 2006.
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) capped Iran’s enrichment at 3.67 percent, limited its stockpile and centrifuges, and gave the IAEA its most intrusive access anywhere, in exchange for sanctions relief. The United States withdrew in 2018; Iran stepped away from its limits from 2019, enriched to 60 percent from 2021, and reduced access thereafter. Its formal termination date was October 2025. The 2025–26 strikes and the September 2026 Board referral are on the situation page.
- The INF Treaty and the ABM Treaty, above.
The pattern is not that treaties fail; most of the instruments on this page are in force and observed. It is that an agreement whose verification is withdrawn, or whose political basis one side renounces, loses its content while its text survives — which is why this module asks of every instrument not only what it says but whether it is verified and whether it is alive.
Explore. (a) For each of the four families, name the instrument that does the most work today and the one that has failed. (b) Explain why the NSG’s 2008 India exemption could be granted without amending any treaty, and what that says about export controls. (c) The CTBT is signed by 187 states and observed by all of them, yet is not in force. What difference does entry into force make? (d) Resolution 1540 binds states that have signed nothing. Why did the Security Council take that route in 2004, and what are its limits?
Sources
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, treaty database (texts, signature and ratification status) — NPT, PTBT, CTBT, TPNW, the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, the Antarctic, Outer Space and Seabed treaties.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/153, INFCIRC/540, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and INFCIRC/254 (Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines).
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, treaty texts and narratives — SALT I, ABM, SALT II, INF, START I, SORT, New START, TTBT, PNET; section 123 agreements in force.
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, status of signature and ratification; International Monitoring System description.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment; Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
- United Nations, Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2663 (2022); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ICSANT.
- Arms Control Association, fact sheets: “Timeline of the NPT,” “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones at a Glance,” “The Nuclear Suppliers Group at a Glance,” “U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” “The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at a Glance,” “Timeline of the JCPOA.”
- National Nuclear Security Administration, HEU Purchase Agreement completion (2013); Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (2000) and Russian suspension (2016).
This material is based in part upon work supported by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration through Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Enabling Capabilities in Technology Consortium under Award Number DE-NA0004197. The views and opinions expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.